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Abstract  
Production equipment designers must ensure the health and safety of future users; in this 
regard, they augment requirements for standardising and controlling operator work. This 
contrasts with the ergonomic view of the activity, which recommends leaving operators 
leeway (margins for manoeuvre) in performing their task, while safeguarding their health. 
Following a brief analysis of design practices in the car industry, we detail how the Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) approach is implemented in this sector. We then 
suggest an adaptation that enables designers to consider real work situations. This new 
protocol, namely work situation FMEA, allows experience feedback to be used to defend the 
health standpoint during designer project reviews, which usually only address quality and 
performance issues. We subsequently illustrate the advantage of this approach using two 
examples of work situations at car parts manufacturers: the first from the literature and the 
second from an in-company industrial project we followed. 
1. PROBLEM
Work equipment design is a prime prevention area and its importance is fully acknowledged 
in the occupational health and safety field: the integrated prevention strategy is currently 
shared by all European countries [1]. Its purpose is to achieve a minimum level of health and 
safety risk for users of future production systems. Hence, there has been extensive scientific 
research aimed at assisting designers in their risk assessment and reduction approach [2, 3, 
4]. Designers can also resort to standards, which do not represent a regulatory duty, but do 
reflect current knowledge and technology. In the prevention of musculoskeletal disorders 
(MSDs), a major occupational health challenge [5], ergonomic standards are therefore of 
assistance in assessing operator stresses, whether they be related to their physical [6] or 
mental [7] workload. These normative benchmarks are mainly based on a biomechanical 
approach to ergonomics, sometimes termed task ergonomics [8]. This approach relates to a 
model of the standard human being and leaves little leeway for considering variability, which 
is nevertheless inherent to every work system or situation1. This variability can be technical 
(machine failure), organisational (no colleague, response to production urgency), or human 
(variability amongst and within individuals).  
Studying real work situations and their variabilities lies at the very heart of analyses 
performed using activity-centred ergonomics, a francophone approach, which considers 
work as close as possible to operator reality. Many studies implement activity ergonomics at 
design stage [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].  Emphasis is placed on the fact that there is invariably a 
major difference between what the designers have imagined and stipulated (the task) and 
what will ultimately be performed by the operators (the activity); one line of occupational risk 
prevention then involves leaving the operators sufficient leeway (margins for manoeuvre) to 
be able to adjust their way of working to the situation, to what appears to them most suitable 
or least stressful, to what is possible or impossible, etc. [15, 16]. This leeway is reflected, for 
example, by the possibility for the operator to vary his/her gestural activity [17], to adjust 
his/her rhythm of work or to work in a pair based on a suitable workstation spatial 
configuration [18]. Margins for manoeuvre of this type thus enable operators to reach an 
acceptable compromise between performance and personal commitment, while 
safeguarding health. 
It is therefore up to the designers to create these margins for manoeuvre [19] or at least 
conserve those that exist already to ensure that systems are adaptable to the work activity 
and not just to an average nominal situation. However, these objectives remain far removed 
from existing practices of designers. They have no formal means or tools for considering this 
notion of margins for manoeuvre and, more generally, this approaching of work situations 
[20]. On the contrary, designers seek to limit as much as possible all forms of variability and 
to standardise work situations for reasons of cost, quality and production time. This is 
especially true in relation to deployment of lean manufacturing-type rationalisation 
approaches, in which systematic elimination of so-called no added value actions (holding, 
displacements, buffer stocks, etc.) tends to reduce operator margins for manoeuvre [21, 22].  
In this context, this paper introduces an approach aimed at helping engineers and 
technicians to integrate this need to consider work situation variability into their design 
projects and to conserve operator margins for manoeuvre. 
The principle retained is to base design work as much as possible on the methodological 
tools known to designers to facilitate subsequent adoption of the approach.  
2. STATE OF THE ART
2.1. Design practices 
Prior to conducting the study described in this paper, an exploratory survey was held at 10 
French car industry subcontractors. Discussions with manufacturers in particular provided 
confirmation of the main contextual problems experienced in the car sector design activity: 
budget is the greatest constraint in this competitive environment and represents a limit to 
considering operator health and safety in the design process. For example, some companies 
admitted to overlooking workstation ergonomics during project development for cost 
reasons. This observation corroborates the results of a 2012 survey of Swedish designers: 
half the engineers questioned observed that regulatory constraints alone were not enough to 
ensure deployment of ergonomic solutions, if they were expensive [23]. Lack of time is also a 
problem for designers, who sometimes have to leave workstation and work standard 
finalisation in the hands of production sites. Hence, in the face of client diversity, designers 
have to work with multiple order givers embodying different practices and cultures: each 
implementing its own reference frame (design, quality, purchasing, logistics, etc.) involving 
specific operating methods, formalisms and constraints.  
This exploratory survey also provided an up-to-date view of procedures and methodological 
tools used to design new production equipment. In particular, it showed that the Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) procedure was implemented in all 10 of the companies 
surveyed. This approach is effectively often imposed by their clients (car and car part 
manufacturers). By following a design project at one of this companies, we were able to 
confirm that regular FMEA meetings attended by design, production planning and methods, 
quality, management and production itself were held throughout the design process and that 
this analysis evolved in line with the decisions and directions adopted for the project.  
2.2 Use of FMEA 
FMEA is a procedure used in design to analyse a priori the risks of failure of the designed 
product or its manufacturing process, which could have unwanted effects on its quality. 
Initially developed by the American army [24], FMEA has gradually been adapted to other 
civil sectors, firstly in the aerospace industry and subsequently in the car industry, in which it 
has imposed itself long term [25]. Several types of FMEA (Design, Process, System, 
Logistics, etc.) are used depending on the system, to which the analysis is applied. This 
paper only refers to Process FMEA (P-FMEA) since our problem primarily concerns the 
design of production equipment. P-FMEA has been methodically applied [26] to the product 
manufacturing process, which it has been necessary to break down into elementary 
production stages. For each of these stages, the P-FMEA starts with a survey of potential or 
already proven process failures. The effects, causes and means of detecting these failures 
are then sought and consolidated in a summary table (see Table 1). The failures are then 
prioritised by applying a criticality index RPN (Risk Priority Number) calculated from three 
scores between 1 and 10. These scores relate to the severity of the failure effect (S), its 
probability of occurrence (O) and the probability of detecting the fault (D). Corrective action is 
required beyond a certain RPN threshold defined by the company. A manager and expected 
deadline are then assigned to this action. A new provisional rating (S’, O’, D’) then allows 
definition of the criticality RPN’ of the corrected situation and confirm whether it effectively 
corresponds to the expected level of reliability. 
Table I 
Various studies have already attempted to improve the FMEA procedure, in particular by 
pointing out the limits of the failure rating and prioritisation system [27] or by trying to enrich it 
with new parameters: e.g. by considering costs [28] or factors related to a lean system [29]. 
Proposals also exist for using formalisms close to FMEA in the risk prevention field: some 
authors thus take into account the cost of risks caused by an unergonomic design [30]. 
Village et al. propose a Human Factors-FMEA for analysing each failure causing risks to 
quality and operator health and safety [31]. The Safety-FMEA [32] also represents a 
procedure for analysing the risk to user safety of a work equipment item. This takes into 
account the probability of a hazardous situation arising, the operator exposure time and 
his/her avoidance options, and the severity of potential injuries. This approach aimed at 
assisting designers in their a priori risk assessment process is nevertheless restricted to 
accident risks. 
This theoretical view of FMEA and its spin-offs, as well as knowledge of its usage in the car 
industry provided confirmation of its readiness to support our research. The procedure is 
effectively multidisciplinary and iterative, and it can be applied right from the first stages of a 
new production line design process; this corresponds closely to the characteristics expected 
of an integrated occupational risk prevention approach [1, 33]. 
It is important to remember that, unlike Berthe & Vimeux [32], our aim is not to use P-FMEA 
for a priori risk assessment, but to contribute to it by taking special care to conserve operator 
margins for manoeuvre. The purpose of the P-FMEA development proposed in this paper is 
to widen the initial analysis area by integrating therein experience feedback data on real 
work situations and differences observed with respect to stipulated operating procedures.  
For the developed approach to be used, it must consider the restricted context, to which the 
car industry design activity is subjected (cf. 2.1). The approach must also curtail its impact on 
the design process by minimising any additional costs and times that it may generate. 
Furthermore, it must be flexible enough to adapt itself to different benchmarks imposed by 
multiple ordering parties. 
3. METHODOLOGY
Theoretical research based on P-FMEA has prompted us to propose an adaptation thereof, 
which we call work situation-FMEA (WS-FMEA). The P-FMEA formalism has therefore been 
modified to offer designers the possibility of adding a health and safety dimension into their 
production equipment reliability and quality improvement process. 
We use an example from the literature to illustrate our proposed approach and construction 
of the related support. This support, which takes the form of a table, is the starting point 
enabling the project team to exchange around operator activity, which is rarely discussed at 
design stage. 
We then apply WS-FMEA to a second example emanating from a case study we conducted 
at a car industry subcontracting company, which involved monitoring a production line 
modification project. The approach was then presented to, and discussed with, the project 
team at this company. 
4. RESULTS
4.1. WS-FMEA: Work Situation Failure Mode & Effects Analysis 
Construction of the WS-FMEA procedure and the related table involved retaining the 
following columns and parameters:   
• Process step. This first column is identical to that of P-FMEA and allows the analysis
to be broken down station by station, operation by operation. This condition is
essential. It is in fact the common starting point for both P-FMEA and WS-FMEA
analyses, which can therefore be conducted in parallel, while remaining related.
• Real work situation. This second column allows experience feedback to be
introduced by identifying work situations out of compliance with stipulated nominal
conditions. This column therefore shows the variability in all its previously described
forms: it is important that the users validate collectively the variability data reported in
this column. Their relevance to working conditions will hence be legitimate. Different
methods emanating from the ergonomic approach (observations, interviews, self-
confrontations, etc.) can be used in this connection [34];
• Causes/Effects, risks. In these 2 columns, we analyse in a participative way the
reasons underlying the identified deviations and their potential effects on the work
situation. Based on the literature [35, 36, 37], 3 criteria were therefore retained for
qualifying them: performance, quality and working conditions. A cause or effect can
therefore stem from one or more of these criteria;
• Severity/Probability/Criticality. In a conventional FMEA, standard rating charts are
often used to assess failure criticality and prioritise the action plan. In the same way,
severity and probability criteria were selected to characterise the risks identified in the
WS-FMEA. This description does not include the method of calculating these criteria,
thereby leaving it up to the FMEA teams to develop their own assessment scales;
• Actions. Envisaged actions can be of three types:
- Validate: the existing situation is acceptable. Within a prevention perspective, 
this option is possible if the observed deviation represents an operator health 
and safety risk (Working conditions box checked in the Effects–Risks column); 
- Reject: the existing situation is unacceptable and the nominal situation must 
be restored. Again, within a prevention perspective, this option will be 
impossible if the working conditions have caused the deviation 
(Working conditions box checked in the Causes column); 
- Supervise: the situation is acceptable subject to improvement. For example, 
measures must be taken to ensure that the operation is safely performed. 
To illustrate the proposal embraced by this new table, we base ourselves on a work situation 
example described in the literature within the scope of an ergonomic operation conducted at 
a car parts manufacturer. This study revealed, in particular, that production line work crews 
spend nearly a third of their time working outside the standard operating procedure [38]:  
"…for example, one of them (production crew) builds up a stock of 6 work-in-progress parts 
in the middle of its line. The maximum authorised number (a standard) is 3 parts in progress. 
But the crew has learnt that, when a very specific maintenance fault occurs on one of the 
machines, its resolution time corresponds to de-stocking of 6 parts. Despite maintenance 
department interventions, this fault is recurrent, almost daily. Contravening the standard by 
doubling the work-in-progress stock avoids a break in the production flow".  
To integrate this view of a real work situation, the WS-FMEA table was completed as follows: 
Table II 
The observed real work situation is characterised by line operation with a mid-line stock of 6 
parts in progress instead of 3. This doubling of the stock can be taken into account in WS-
FMEA procedure because it is validated by all operators involved: "…, the work group 
agreed to deviate from the operating standard and to adopt strategies (stock doubling) 
capable of anticipating a work incident (machine failure)". 
The Performance box in the Causes column is therefore checked since the operators deviate 
from the required standard to avoid a break in the line flow and guarantee production 
continuity.  
The Working conditions box is checked in the Effects–Risks column. The ergonomic analysis 
effectively indicates that this deviation from the operating standard represents a health risk 
for operators, who have to conceal it from their management: "in the case of doubling the 3 
parts in progress required by the standard to 6, the crew intentionally reduces this number to 
zero, during its work break, to leave the line visibly empty, thereby preventing management 
from having to issue reprimands". …  "Far from being fun, this game is not without danger. It 
confines the work crew's operating resources to darkness, at best reducing them to a 
trivialised form, at worst transforming them into a stigmatising burden".  
The Quality box is also checked because of the potential risks of scratching the products 
under uncontrolled storage conditions. 
With regard to the actions to be implemented and applying the proposed rules, it may 
therefore be decided to tolerate this operating practice with 6 work-in-progress parts subject 
to its supervision: for example, a suitable support could be installed to prevent the risk of 
degrading part quality. On the other hand, the project team could not reject the deviation and 
continue to impose a 3-part stock; this would amount to constraining the operators, obliging 
them to follow a theoretical standard and depriving them of the necessary margins for 
manoeuvre in confronting work system instability. 
4.2. Application of WS-FMEA in a manufacturing case  
Let us now consider the following real situation encountered during our case study at a car 
parts manufacturer: this involved analysing an assembly operation for a clip used to secure 
an electrical wiring harness on a plastic component. Table III shows a line of the P-FMEA 
that assesses the quality risks involved in this operation. This analysis extract is 
representative of a "conventional" P-FMEA procedure of the kind practised at this company. 
Table III 
If the clip is not installed (failure), the part may be noisy after assembly and usage on the 
vehicle (effect). The main identified cause of this failure is operator oversight. The only 
means of detection initially envisaged was visual inspection performed by the operator. After 
rating, the RPN of 75 proved critical (exceeding the threshold value of 36 specified by the 
company) and an action plan was implemented: a so-called hand-passing sensor, detecting 
the presence of the operator's hand in the clip supply bin, was duly added. If the status of 
this sensor does not change before the end of the production cycle, the part is blocked at the 
workstation and cannot be transferred to the following step.   
As this example shows and as is often the case, P-FMEA analyses are essentially technical: 
human factors are rarely involved and, when the operator is considered, it is as a potential 
cause of failure (the cause is then referred to by expressions such as "operator oversight", 
"operator mistake", "operating procedure not respected", etc.). As noted when attending 
FMEA meetings, there is usually no in-depth analysis to determine the reasons for these 
"mistakes" or deviations from the standard laid down. 
Moreover, action plans often result in reinforcement of design "barriers" to curtail work 
variability. In the above example and according the Hollnagel's proposed classification [39], 
the initial, so called immaterial, barrier (operating procedure requiring simple visual 
inspection) was strengthened by installing a second barrier, the hand passing sensor, which 
is functional this time. 
Table IV illustrates the WS-FMEA procedure for this clip installation operation: the designers 
were planning to reproduce the solution implemented on a similar line (hand passing 
sensor), but the production manager mentioned that the operators stored the clips in their 
pockets, despite this device. Workstation observation effectively confirmed that most 
operators bypassed the procedure and the installed hand passing sensor. This deviation 
from the standard allowed the operators to anticipate clip fitting at the previous workstation 
and thereby ensure production, while giving themselves margins for manoeuvre. The causes 
referred to were related to performance (time saving) and working conditions (comfort). The 
main potential effect of this deviation involves product quality. The risk of forgetting to install 
the clip since the detection system is (already) systematically bypassed. In applying the 
proposed action, the designers simply validate an existing situation: this option would 
effectively come down to reinforcing the barriers (procedures, sensors, etc.) to constrain the 
operators, obliging them to follow the specified operating procedure, by curtailing their 
margins for manoeuvre. They can only validate or else control the existing situation: a 
possible solution possible would then be to control this practice, without prohibiting it, and to 
ensure clip presence by other means (e.g. using a clip detector installed at the next 
workstation). Performance and working conditions would thereby be improved, while 
minimising the quality risk.  
Table IV 
This action was then presented to, and discussed with, the manufacturing partner, who 
confirmed its advantage: Technicians and engineers are in fact fully conscious that they deal 
with problems by developing technical solutions, but this new approach enables them to 
analyse the impact of their decisions on the real work of operators and to consider human 
factors in their design. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The investigative survey of designers at car parts manufacturers and this research have 
revealed the importance of extending the P-FMEA procedure beyond the usually adopted 
unique standpoints of quality and performance. In this connection, we have proposed the 
WS-FMEA model, which is based on formalism close to that already implemented by 
designers. This approach therefore integrates naturally into the design process, mobilising 
no additional resources or time since the main stakeholders are already in place within the 
P-FMEA framework.  
The two examples processed using this approach highlight the significance of conducting a 
cause and effect analysis, based on the real work situation, for each step considered in a 
conventional P-FMEA. The design team can then assess the impact of its decisions and of 
the different production practices observed on the basis of three criteria: performance, 
quality and working conditions. Designers and prevention specialists can then start 
discussions around factors involving the variability of real work situations. This procedure 
thereby contributes to conserving or providing margins for manoeuvre essential to operator 
health and safety. It falls within an integrated prevention framework and reinforces the idea 
that only a holistic approach to the man-at-work model will achieve an optimum 
organisational performance level [40].  
Discussions with the manufacturers we met also involved the formalism of the tables used. 
Two options are in fact feasible: either separating the two tables or merging them by creating 
two lines for each process stage (one for quality aspects, the other for work situation 
aspects). The second option offers the advantage of having only one support, but it 
nevertheless requires care at the failure mode prioritisation stage since the failure modes are 
different in the two approaches. Moreover, the P-FMEA is often a contract document 
required by the client in a specific format for its own quality reference frame, which requires 
part of the data contained in it. Using a second table allows us to overcome these two 
constraints, although the option retained depends ultimately on the company and its 
practices. 
The significance of the FMEA approach depends on availability of data allowing more 
accurate failure characterisation and action plan prioritisation; both production and customer 
experience feedback are important for this: defect frequency and detection capability, 
failures, warranty-based returns, etc. This is all the more true for the WS-FMEA, which 
highlights the differences between specified standards (instructions) and work reality. It is 
therefore important to have relevant experience feedback enabling us to envisage not only 
work situations, but also variability and malfunctions. Availability of a process similar to that 
being designed is therefore helpful so that problems raised can be transposed and applied to 
the future project. The more innovative the design, the more difficult it is to provide factual 
data for analysing potential work situation variability. While the retained formalism therefore 
enables one to work on innovative projects in terms of technology and organisation, the 
approach is more easily applicable to projects involving the re-design, modification or 
adaptation of already known processes.  
Another limitation arises, when one questions the willingness and real capacity of designers 
to integrate operator working conditions into their design process. Are they indeed capable of 
managing new constraints associated, on the one hand, with building up usable experience 
feedback and, on the other hand, with managing the actions required to take employee 
health into account? All the more so since consideration of work situation variability equates 
to partially calling into question their way of designing. However, every operator comment 
and expectation concerning working conditions cannot all be considered by designers: 
Operator involvement in design processes often prompts multiple non-constructive criticisms 
and contradictory demands, which ultimately tends to increase deadlines [20]. Hence, the 
existing activity needs to be analysed in detail in order to identify the important elements of 
the experience feedback. Ergonomic analysis of work situations similar to that being 
designed can list individual, industrial or organisational variabilities in association with 
knowledge of the man-at-work model. Research therefore continues on the interrelationship 
between production activity and design, focusing on the one hand on methods of acquiring 
experience feedback [34] and, on the other hand, on knowledge of the design discipline. 
These two lines of thinking will ultimately enable identification of levers for action favourable 
to consideration of occupational risk prevention requirements right from design stage. 
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TABLES 
Table I. Example of an empty Process FMEA form
PROCESS 
STEP 
FAILURE 
MODE EFFECT 
SE
V
ER
IT
Y
(S
)
CAUSE 
O
C
C
U
R
R
EN
C
E
 (O
) 
DETECTION 
D
E
T
EC
TI
O
N
 (D
) 
R
PN
 =
 S
 ×
 O
 ×
 D
 
ACTIONS RESPON-SIBILITY DEADLINE 
SE
V
ER
IT
Y
 (S
') 
O
C
C
U
R
R
EN
C
E
 (O
') 
D
E
T
EC
TI
O
N
 (D
') 
R
PN
' =
 S
' ×
 O
' ×
 D
' 
Workstation 000: Operation 000
Note: RPN = Risk Priority Number 
Table II. Example of work situation analysis using proposed table (from [38]) 
PROCESS 
STEP 
REAL 
WORK 
SITUATIONS 
CAUSES EFFECTS, RISKS 
SE
V
ER
IT
Y
 (S
) 
PR
O
BA
B
IL
IT
Y
 (P
) 
C
R
IT
IC
IT
Y
 (C
 =
 S
 ×
 P
) 
ACTIONS 
SE
V
ER
IT
Y
 (S
') 
PR
O
BA
B
IL
IT
Y
 (P
’) 
C
R
IT
IC
IT
Y
 (C
’ =
 S
’ ×
 P
’)
 
Workstation 000: Operation 000 
Step 1 Stock of 6 
parts in 
progress 
instead of 3 
(maximum 
allowed) 
 [X]  Performance 
To avoid 
flow 
disruptions 
caused by 
machine 
failure 
 [  ]  Performance 
[  ] Reject 
[  ] Validate 
[X] Manage 
Authorize 6 
parts in 
progress with 
suitable support 
 [  ]  Quality  [X]  Quality 
Risk of 
scratches 
5 3 15 5 1 5 
 [  ]  Working    
conditions 
 [X]  Working    
conditions 
Operator’s 
stigmatiza-
tion 
5 2 10 5 1 5 
Note: Bolded figures are calculated: criticity (C) corresponds to the multiplication of severity (S) and 
probability (P). 
Table III. Example of failure analysis in a Process FMEA (from industrial case study) 
PROCESS 
STEP 
FAILURE 
MODE EFFECT 
SE
V
ER
IT
Y
(S
)
CAUSE 
O
C
C
U
R
R
EN
C
E
 (O
) 
DETECTION 
D
E
T
EC
TI
O
N
 (D
) 
R
PN
 =
 S
 ×
 O
 ×
 D
 
ACTIONS RESPON-SABILITY DEADLINE 
SE
V
ER
IT
Y
 (S
') 
O
C
C
U
R
R
EN
C
E
 (O
') 
D
E
T
EC
TI
O
N
 (D
') 
R
PN
' =
 S
' ×
 O
' ×
 D
' 
Workstation 010: WIRING HARNESS ASSEMBLY
Clip fitting No clip Noisy 
product 
5 Operator 
oversight 
3 Visual self-
inspection 
5 75 Clip pick-up 
detection (hand 
passing sensor) 
AL Feb. 14 5 3 2 30
Note: Bolded figures are calculated: Risk Priority Number (RPN) corresponds to the multiplication of 
severity (S), occurrence (O) and detection (D). 
Table IV. Example of work situation analysis using proposed table (from industrial case study) 
PROCESS 
STEP 
REAL 
WORK 
SITUATIONS 
CAUSES EFFECTS, RISKS 
SE
V
ER
IT
Y
 (S
) 
PR
O
BA
B
IL
IT
Y
 (P
) 
C
R
IT
IC
IT
Y
 (C
 =
 S
 ×
 P
) 
ACTIONS 
SE
V
ER
IT
Y
 (S
') 
PR
O
BA
B
IL
IT
Y
 (P
’) 
C
R
IT
IC
IT
Y
 (C
’ =
 S
’ ×
 P
’)
 
Workstation 10: WIRING HARNESS ASSEMBLY 
Clip fitting 
with trolley 
at 
workstation 
Installation 
anticipated at 
previous 
workstation 
and hand 
passed in 
front of sensor 
 [X]  Performance 
Time 
saving 
 [  ]  Performance 
[  ] Reject 
[  ] Validate 
[X] Manage 
Clip auto-
detection installed 
at next 
workstation 
 [  ]  Quality  [X]  Quality 
Clip 
forgotten
5 3 15 5 1 5 
 [X]  Working    
conditions 
Comfort 
 [  ]  Working    
conditions 
Note: Bolded figures are calculated: criticity (C) corresponds to the multiplication of severity (S) and 
probability (P). 
